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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GILBERT R. LAMB, 
Applicant/Respondent, 
vs. 
JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT 
(self-insured), 
Defendant/Respondent, 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH (formerly State 
Insurance Fund), 
Defendant/Appellant, 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over this petition 
for review of an order of the Industrial Commission of Utah is 
conferred by Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-83, as amended, 
1986. This petition is brought to review the order of the 
Indusrial Commission entered in this matter on October 23, 1986 
which awarded certain workers compensation benefits to the 
respondent, Gilbert Lamb pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 35-1-1 et seq. and assessed a portion of the liability 
for those benefits to the appellant, Workers Compensation Fund 
of Utah. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 860272-CA 
Priority No. 6 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Where the respondent, Gilbert Lamb sustained a 
permanent partial disability through a series of industrial 
accidents, did the Industrial Commission err by apportioning 
liability for workers compensation benefits for that disability 
between the respondent, Jordan School District, the injured 
worker's self-insured employer at the time of the last accident 
and the appellant, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, his 
employer's insurance carrier at the time of the previous 
accidents? 
2. Even if it was proper for the Industrial Commission to 
apportion benefits for the injured worker's permanent 
disability between the Jordan School District and the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, did the Commission err in 
apportioning liability between these carriers for the injured 
worker's temporary total disability following the last 
industrial accident? 
3. Even if it was proper for the Industrial Commission to 
apportion liability for the injured worker's temporary total 
disability following the last industrial accident between the 
Jordan School District and the Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah, did the Commission err in requiring the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah to pay its share of the liability at 
the compensation rate attributable to the last accident and by 
not requiring the Second Injury Fund to share liability with 
the Workers Compensation Fund for this compensation? 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PRpVISIONS 
The appellant beleives that the following statutory 
provisions are either fundemental or important in the 
determination of the issues presented for review herein: 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-45, 46, 65, 66, and 69, 
(See Addendum, items 1-5.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CA^E 
Nature of the Casq 
This case is a petition for review of an order of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah holding the appellant Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah liable for workers compensation 
disability benefits to the respondent Gilbert R. Lamb. 
Course and Disposition in the Industrial Commission 
On March 18, 1985 Gilbert R. Lamb f^led an application for 
hearing with the Industrial Commissipn of Utah requesting 
adjudication of a claim for workers' compensation benefits 
arising out of an industrial accident pccuring on December 5, 
1984 while in the course of his employment with Jordan School 
District. (R-68.) In an amended answer to that application 
filed by the self-insured employer through their agent Smith 
Administrators, joinder of the Workers! Compensation Fund of 
Utah (known at the time as the State Insurance Fund) was 
requested. (R-90.) On May 31, 1985 the Workers Compensation 
Fund of Utah was made a party to the proceedings through the 
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filing of three applications for hearing on claims arising out 
of industrial accidents pre-dating the December 5, 1984 
accident. (R-6, 21, 41.) 
On September 30, 1985, a hearing was held before Timothy C. 
Allen, an administrative law judge of the Industrial 
Commission. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Allen took 
the matter under advisement pending referral to a medical panel 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77. (R-143.) On 
August 20, 1986, Judge Allen issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order which awarded permanent partial 
disability benefits to Mr. Lamb, liability for which was 
apportioned among the Second Injury Fund, the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, and the self-insured Jordan School 
District relative to the findings of the medical panel with 
respect to the underlying causes of the permanent partial 
impairment of the injured worker. (R 209-216.) 
On August 29, 1986, the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
filed a Motion for Review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 35-1-82.53, arguing that the administrative law judge 
had no statutory authority to apportion disability compensation 
between the Workers Compensation Fund and the self-insured 
employee (R 217-218.) 
On September 3, 1986 Jordan School District also filed a 
Motion for Review contending that since permanent partial 
disability compensation had been apportioned according to the 
medical panel's assessment of the causation of Mr. Lamb's 
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permanent physical impairment, the judge should have also so 
apportioned the temporary total disability compensation 
accruing after the December 5, 1984 accident. (R 249-250.) 
In an order dated October 23, 1986, the Industrial 
Commission denied the Workers Compensation Fund's Motion for 
Review and granted the Motion for Review of Jordan School 
District. 
The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah filed a Petition for 
Writ of Review in the Utah Supreme Couipt on November 19, 1986 
and entitled the action Workers Compensation Fund of Utah v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, et al., Case No. 860590. The 
case was subsequently assigned to this Cburt and is entitled as 
set forth on the cover of this brief pursuant to Rule 27 of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 50A Utah Adv. Rep., January 
13, 1987. 
Statement of Fact^ 
The facts surrounding the various injuries sustained by 
Gilbert Lamb are undisputed and are set forth in detail in the 
administrative law judge's Findings of Falct. (R 209-211.) 
In approximately 1960 while in tihe employ of Central 
Electric in Santa Maria, California, the respondent Gilbert R. 
Lamb first injured his back. After brief medical treatment he 
had no further problems with his back uifitil November 18, 1980. 
(R-210.) 
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On November 18, 1980 Mr. Lamb was working for Jordan School 
District as an electrician in their maintanence shop. (R 
94.) On that day he went to the warehouse to find a motor and 
while looking on a lower shelf while in an awkward position, he 
twisted and injured his back. (R 95.) This injury did not 
result in any lost time from work and after brief medical 
treatment he had no further problems as a result of this 
incident. (R 96-97.) 
Mr. Lamb continued to work for Jordan School District. On 
August 18, 1982 he sustained another on-the-job injury to his 
low back while attempting to climb out of a swimming pool he 
had been working in. (R 99-101.) The Workers Compensation 
Fund, the District's compensation insurance carrier at the 
time, paid Mr. Lamb's medical bills associated with this 
incident along with temporary total disability compensation for 
the time Mr. Lamb was off work. (R-27, 133.) 
While still in the employ of Jordan School District, Mr. 
Lamb again injured his low back. This occured on June 24, 1984 
when he slipped after jumping from one rooftop to another while 
earring a pipe or shaft. (R 108-109.) Mr. Lamb's medical 
bills were again paid for by the Workers Compensation Fund. 
(R 112-113, 32.) Mr. Lamb continued to work without lost time 
after this incident. (R-41.) 
On December 5, 1984 while in the course of his employment 
with Jordon School District, Mr. Lamb slipped on ice covering 
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the parking lot at his workplace, and once again injured his 
low back. (R 114-115.) He attempted to return to work the 
following day but the pain was so severe he was unable to 
function and so he had to go home. (& 116-117.) Mr. Lamb 
remained unable to work as of January 31, 1985 when the 
adjusting company for Jordan School District, now self-insured, 
terminated his temporary total disability benefits. (R-211, 
42, 86.) Mr. Lamb was thereafter treated by an orthopedic 
surgeon who performed low back surgery on him on March 14, 
1985. (R-211, 124.) At the time of the Commission's hearing 
on September 30, 1985 Mr. Lamb had still not been able to 
return to work. (R-117.) 
The medical panel report dated May 5, 1986 found that the 
surgery of March 14, 1985 was necessitated by conditions 
existing prior to 1980 and the combined effects of the 
accidents of August 10, 1982, June 14, 1984, and December 5, 
1984. The panel further found that Mr. Lamb had a permanent 
partial impairment of 12.5% of the whole person from conditions 
existing prior to 1980. In addition, the panel concluded that 
the combined effects of the accident ih 1982 and the two in 
1984 had caused Mr. Lamb to sustain an additional 12.5% 
permanent impairment to the whole person. (R 199-204.) On 
the basis of this report, the administrative law judge made his 
findings and order. (R-212.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Industrial Commission erred by ordering apportionment 
between Jordan School District and the Workers Compensation 
Fund of Utah of the permanent partial and temporary total 
disability compensation awarded to Gilbert Lamb. As clearly 
stated by the Utah Supreme Court, there is no authority under 
the law of this state for apportionment of workers' 
compensation disability benefits in multiple accident cases. 
The law requires the employer or insurance carrier at the time 
of the last accident to pay the compensation resulting from the 
combined injuries* If there is an apportionment remedy 
availabe to the last employer or carrier in a multiple accident 
case, it is to be found in Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-69 
(1953, as amended) which provides for reinsurance by the Second 
Injury Fund for the effects of injuries existing prior to the 
last industrial injury. 
Even if the Commission properly apportioned the permanent 
partial disability benefits, it exceeded its authority in 
apportioning the temporary total disability compensation 
accruing after the last accident between Jordan School District 
and the Workers Compensation Fund. Recent decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court mandate that Utah Code Annotated, Section 
35-1-69 (1953, as amended), be applied in this case so that the 
apportionment of disability and medical benefits from the last 
accident is soley between Jordan School District and the Second 
Injury Fund, 
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Finally, if the Commission can apportion liability for both 
temporary total and permanent partial disability compensation 
between the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah and Jordan School 
District, the Commission erred in failing to use the correct 
method of apportionment with the Second Injury Fund and in 
failing to make the Workers Compensation Fund's share of the 
temporary total disability compensation payable at the 
compensation rates in effect at the tim^ of Mr. Lamb's August, 
1982 and June, 1984 accidents. Utah Code Annotated, Section 
35-1-65 (1953, as amended) requires that the weekly rate for 
temporary total disability compensatilon be based on the 
employee's average weekly wage and th^ state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury for which the employer is liable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY 
IN ORDERING APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY FOR 
GILBERT LAMB'S WORKERS COMPENSATION DISABILITY 
BENEFITS BETWEEN THE SELF-INSURED JORDAN SCHOOL 
DISTRICT AND THE WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF 
UTAH. 
A. THE ISSUE OF THE LEGALITYf OF APPORTIONMENT 
OF WORKERS COMPENSATION BENEFITS IN A MULTIPLE 
ACCIDENT CASE IS A QUESTION OF LAW REQUIRING THE 
APPELLATE COURT TO APPLY A CORRECTION OF ERROR 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The Industrial Commission's findings regarding the facts 
surrounding the respondent Gilbert Lamb's multiple industrial 
accidents are not in dispute. What is in dispute is the 
legality of the Commission's order base^ i on its interpretation 
of the law. (R 254-257.) Therefore, it is proper for this 
Court to apply a correction-of-error standard of review with no 
deference to the expertise of the Commission. Board of 
Education of Apline School District v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 
1984). 
B. UNDER THE PRECEDENT IN THIS STATE ADOPTING 
THE "LAST INJURIOUS EXPOSURE" RULE, JORDAN SCHOOL 
DISTRICT AS THE CARRIER AT THE TIME OF THE LAST 
ACCIDENT SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR MR. LAMB'S ENTIRE 
COMPENSATION AWARD. 
That the Commission's interpretation of law upon which it 
based its order apportioning compensation in this case is 
erroneous is readily apparent from an analysis of Utah's 
Worker's Compensation Act and the case law of this and the 
majority of other states which have dealt with the issue of 
apportionment. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-1 et seq. (1953, as 
amended) establishes a system for compensating workers 
sustaining job related injuries by accident. Section 46 places 
the liability for workers compensation benefits for a worker 
injured as described in Section 45 upon the employer, who in 
turn may cover the risk by obtaining insurance with the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, or from a private insurance company, 
or by being a qualified self-insured entity. The benefits 
payable by the employer or its insurance carrier are spelled 
out in considerable detail in the Act, and include the payment 
of medical expenses incurred in treating the worker's injuries 
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(Section 81), compensation for temporary total disability 
during the period the injured worker is recovering from his 
injuries and unable to work (Section 65), and payment of 
permanent partial disability compensation for the permanent 
physical impairment to the worker caused by the injury (Section 
66). Expressly stated and implied irk this system is the 
requirement that the injury or injuries giving rise to these 
disabilities and the need for medical treatment be causally 
related to an accident occuring while ^he worker was employed 
with the employer against whom he is asserting the claim for 
benefits. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45 states that the 
injured employee "shall be paid such compensation for loss 
sustained on account of such injury...". That is, the injury 
which occured in the course of his employment with the employer 
against whom the claim is made. 
Given the requirement that there be a causal connection 
between the loss sustained by the worker and the particular 
injury for which compensation is claimed, the question has 
often arisen as it has in this case of what is to be done in 
those situations where a series of industrial injuries combine 
to bring about a disability which is greater than would have 
resulted from any one of the injuries blone. In response to 
this question a majority of states have adopted either by 
statute or judicial decision what is known as the "last 
injurious exposure" rule. See Larson, Workmen* s Compensation, 
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Desk Edition, Volume 2, Section 95.20 at 17-35. Professor 
Larson explains the operation of this rule: 
The "last injurious exposure" rule in 
successive injury cases places full liability 
upon the carrier covering the risk at the time of 
the most recent injury that bears a causal 
relation to the disability...Although the 
statutory provisions for the use of the rule 
frequently refer only to occupational disease, 
the rule is often applied in accidental injury 
cases also. 
Larson, Section 95.20 at 17-35, 36. 
Professor Larson also mentions that it is important in 
applying the rule to know what type of injury has been 
sustained. From the medical panel report upon which the 
Commission's findings and order are based, it is clear that in 
the present case, Mr. Lamb's December 5, 1984 injury is 
characterized as an aggravation of pre-existing injuries. (R 
203-204.) If that accident aggravated Mr. Lamb's pre-1980 
condition, and the other industrial accidents did the same, it 
logically follows that the December 5, 1984 injury aggravated 
the two previous industrial injuries. According to Professor 
Larson, the "last injurious exposure" rule is applied to cases 
involving the common situation of "employment under the second 
insurer aggravating.the prior injury..." Larson, Section 95.22 
at 17-38. Therefore the "last injurious exposure" rule would 
apply to the present case if Utah follows the majority of 
jurisdictions on this question. Arguably, it does. 
The first case before the Utah Supreme Court dealing 
squarely with this issue was Duaine Brown Chevrolet Co. v. 
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Industrial Commission, 29 Utah 2d 478, 511 P.2d 743 (1973). 
The injured worker in Brown had sustained a series of injuries 
while in the course of his employment between the years 1965 
and 1970, including an injury on April 1, 1970 while in the 
employ of Capitol Chevrolet Company and an injury on November 
14, 1970 while employed by Duaine Brown Chevrolet Company. The 
Industrial Commission's medical panel w^s unable to attribute 
the worker's herniated discs to any one of the injuries and 
attempted to apportion the worker's impairment among the 
various accidents. In upholding the Commission's refusal to 
apportion liability for benefits among the various accidents 
and thus requiring the employer at the time of the last 
accident to pay the entire award, the (pourt, speaking through 
Justice Tuckett said: 
Some states have apportionment statutes 
which allow a recovery to b^ pro-rated among 
multiple insurers. We have no such statute in 
Utah, nor has the court attempted by decision to 
make apportionments. The record in this case 
would indicate that Storer's last injury 
aggravated his prior disability and the act of 
the commission in assessing the' award against the 
plaintiffs was correct. Citing Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation, Section 95.31. 
29 Utah 2d at 480, 511 P.2d at 745. 
Two years after the Brown case, the Utah Supreme Court was 
asked by another worker's compensation insurance carrier to 
reverse an Industrial Commission ruling denying apportionment 
of compensation in a serial accident ca£e. In Mountain States 
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Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 535 P.2d 1249 (Utah 
1975), the Court upheld the Commission's denial of 
apportionment in a situation where the worker had sustained 
three back injuries, one in 1969 and two in 1973. Different 
insurance carriers covered the worker's employer at the time of 
each of the accidents. In the Commission proceedings the 
medical panel determined that the first injury had caused a 
herniated disc and that the second and third injuries had 
aggravated this condition finally necessitating surgery after 
the last incident. The panel apportioned a 15% permanent 
partial disability rating equally among the three carriers. 
The Commission, however, required the last carrier to pay the 
entire award. On appeal, the carrier argued that the 
apportionrrent of the medical panel was more precise than in 
Brown. The Court, however, saw nothing in that fact which 
would require a different result from that in Brown. 
As will be readily observed, both of the foregoing cases 
present fact situations almost identical to the one in this 
case. The medical panel found that Mr. Lamb had sustained a 
disability as a result of the accidents of August 10, 1982, 
June 14, 1984 and December 5, 1984 and assigned a 12.5% 
disability rating in a lump sum for all of these accidents, 
(R 203-204.) The only difference in this case is that the 
Commission is ordering apportionment instead of resisting it as 
in Brown and Mountain States Steel. Based on the precedents 
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cited, the Commission was in error and should have required 
Jordan School District to pay the entir^ compensation award in 
the instant case, with recourse to the Second Iniury Fund as is 
discussed below. 
C. RECENT UTAH SUPREME COU^T DECISIONS HAVE 
MODIFIED BUT NOT OVERRULED TH£ "LAST INJURIOUS 
EXPOSURE" RULE IN SERIAL ACCIDENT CASES. 
In its order denying the Workers Compensation Fund's Motion 
for Review and granting Jordan Schobl District's similar 
motion, the Industrial Commission citedj the case of David v. 
Industrial Commission, 649 P.2d 82 (Utah 1982) as authority for 
apportioning workers compensation disability benefits among 
carriers in multiple accident cases. In addition, the Utah 
Supreme Court has just recently issued its ruling in the case 
of Richfield Care Center v. Torgers^n, No. 20412, filed 
February 12, 1987 which seemingly give$ some credence to the 
concept of apportionment of permanent partial disability in 
serial accident cases. However, it is important to note that 
in both of these cases the carrier at the time of the earlier 
accidents admitted liability for permanent partial disability 
attributable to those earlier accidents and did not contest 
apportionment of that type of disability compensation on 
appeal. In a word, no one raised the ifcsue on appeal in these 
cases, and so it was not before the court. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that in both of these cases, the Brown and 
Mountain States Steel cases are not even mentioned, much less 
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specifically overruled. In addition, as will be more fully 
discussed below, the uncontested apportionment made in David 
and Richfield Care Center was only of the permanent partial 
disability attributable to each accident considered 
separately. Temporary total disability after the last accident 
was not apportioned between carriers in either David or 
Richfield Care Center. 
Finally, before relying too heavily on David as authority 
for apportionment of compensation between carriers, the Utah 
Supreme Court's pronouncements in the more recent case of 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty v. The Industrial 
Commission (Anderton), 657 P.2d 764 (1983) should be 
considered. In that case, the worker, Cloyde Anderton had 
sustained an industrial injury in 1962 while employed with KSL 
Radio. At that time USF&G was the workers compensation carrier 
for KSL8 Then in 1973 while still employed with KSL who was 
then insured with Fireman's Fund, Mr. Anderton again injured 
himself. The Court upheld the commission's apportionment of 
medical expenses between Fireman's Fund and USF&G by relying on 
prior cases excluding medical expenses from the definition of 
the term "compensation". The Court said: 
In the instant case, it is thus to be seen that 
the Commission's order which required USF&G to 
continue the payment of medicals attributable to 
Anderton's first injury does not constitute a 
prohibited apportionment of compensation. 
657 P.2d at 766. (Emphasis by the Court.) Unlike in the David 
case, the Brown and Mountain States Steel cases were 
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specifically discussed in Anderton. Therefore, one year after 
the David case, the Court is still saying that apportionment of 
compensation is "prohibited", and it says this in a case where 
the issue and prior case law were cleartly brought before it. 
The Industrial Commission's reliance on David as authority for 
apportionment of compensation in this matter appears to be 
questionable at best. 
Before proceeding to consider the tole the Second Injury 
Fund should have had in this case, cpne additional comment 
should be made with respect to the Industrial Commission's 
basis for apportionment. In the order denying the Workers 
Compensation Fund's motion for review, the Commission seems to 
try to distinguish Brown and Mountain States Steel on the basis 
that none of Mr. Lamb's claims were barred by statutes of 
limitation at the time he applied for commission adjudication. 
(R-256.) However, a careful reading of Brown and Mountain 
States Steel discloses that there were no bars to any of the 
prior claims in those cases either. Therefore, Brown and 
Mountain States Steel cannot be explained away on that basis. 
D. PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 
35-1-69, THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION SHOULD HAVE 
APPORTIONED LIABILITY FOR MR. LKMB'S COMPENSATION 
SOLEY BETWEEN JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT AND THE 
SECOND INJURY FUND. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-69 (1953, as amended) 
provides for the payment of compensation and medical expenses 
for a previously incapacitated employee who sustains an 
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industrial injury which results in permanent incapacity which 
is substantially greater than would have been incurred had 
there been no pre-existing incapacity. The statute further 
provides that compensation shall be awarded on the basis of the 
combined injuries but that the employer shall only be liable 
for the compensation and medical care for the industrial injury 
and that the remainder shall be paid out of the Second Injury 
Fund. Section 69 goes on to define the term "substantially 
greater" (which includes any aggravation of a preexisting 
injury) and to outline the process for reimbursing the carrier 
for medical expenses and compensation associated with the 
pre-existing incapacity. (See Addendum) 
In Anderton, the Utah Supreme Court indicates that the 
purpose of the Second Injury Fund as set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-69 (1953, as amended) is to encourage 
employers to hire the disabled. Consistent with this purpose 
according to the Court, is the use of the Second Injury Fund to 
encourage an employer "to retain an injured or disabled 
employee after an injury without the risk of further liability 
for payment of compensation and medical expenses should a 
subsequent injury occur," 657 P. 2d at 767. Thus, applying 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-69 in a manner consistent 
with the tenets set forth in Anderton to the case at bar 
results in alleviating the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
from liability for Mr. Lamb's compensation while requiring it 
to continue to pay those medical expenses associated with the 
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previous injuries. At the same time, however, Jordan School 
District is not forced to shoulder the entire compensation 
burden. Under the system provided for ijn Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 35-1-69, the Second Injury Fund should reimburse Jordan 
School District for the temporary total) compensation expenses 
attributable to the prior industrial injuries and for the 
compensation and medical expenses attributable to the other 
pre-existing conditions aggravated by the last accident, and 
also pay the permanent disability attributable to the prior 
injuries and conditions. American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 
P.2d 1 (Utah 1984); Second Injury Fund v. Perry's Mill & 
Cabinet Shop, 684 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1984); Veyo Concrete 
Products, Inc. v. Industrial Commissioft, 710 P.2d 172 (Utah 
1985); Richfield Care Center, and Anderton, supra. 
Finally, a word concerning the funding of the Second Injury 
Fund will underscore the public policy enunciated in Anderton 
which forms the underlying argument against apportioning 
compensation liability among insurance carriers in multiple 
accident cases. Under Utah Code Annotated, Sections 
31A-3-201(2) and 35-1-53 all insurance companies writing 
workers compensation insurance in the state, including the 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah and all self-insured 
employers, pay an annual tax on premiums or presumed premiums 
in order to fund the Second Injury F^ ind. Thus, the Second 
Injury Fund is reinsurance designed to effectuate the purposes 
ennunciated in Anderton by establishing a broader base of 
19 
responsibility for pre-existing conditions. McPhie v. United 
States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504 (Utah 1976); Intermountain 
Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Utah 1980). To 
apportion compensation as the Industrial Commission did in this 
case, flies in the face of the stated purposes of the Second 
Injury Fund and the public policy it was designed to promote. 
And if the employer discharges an employee after an accident 
rather than take the risk of having to pay for combined 
injuries, he or his insurance carrier is still held hostage to 
the possibility that further liability on the claim might be 
incurred as the result of a subsequent accident over which that 
employer will have no control. To estimate adequate claim 
reserves becomes virtually impossible under such a system. 
Surely all of this would do little to promote the hiring and 
continued employment of injured workers. On the basis of 
public policy the Commission's attempts at multiple carrier 
apportionment should be rejected, at least until the 
legislature provides for it. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION 
WERE PROPERLY ASSESSED AGAINST THE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND, THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ERRED IN APPORTIONING MR. LAMB'S TEMPORARY TOTAL 
DISABILITY COMPENSATION BETWEEN JORDAN SCHOOL 
DISTRICT AND THE WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND. 
In his order of August 20, 1986, the administrative law 
judge apportioned liability for medical expenses and permanent 
partial disability among the Second Injury Fund, the Workers 
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Compensation Fund of Utah, and the self-insured Jordan School 
District in accordance with the findings of the medical panel 
with respect to Mr. Lamb's permanent impairment. (R 212-215, 
Addendum.) Temporary total disability after the last accident 
was the sole responsibility of Jordan School District, 
self-insured. (R-213.) On review by the Commission, the 
administrative law judge's order was modified so as to require 
the Workers Compensation Fund to pay 34% of the temporary total 
disability compensation after the last accident. Under the 
recent decision of the Utah Supreme C(j>urt in Richfield Care 
Center v. Torgerson, this was clearly in error. 
Appellants have previously argued that the apportionment of 
permanent partial disability in the Richfield Care Center case 
is not controlling authority over that issue in this matter. 
However, regardless of how this court views that case in 
deciding the issue of apportionment of permanent partial 
disability, it is clear that under the Court's ruling in 
Richfield Care Center, the Commission $hould have apportioned 
liability for Mr. Lamb's temporary tot^l disability after the 
December 5, 1984 accident soley between the Second Injury Fund 
and the self-insured Jordan School District. As is stated by 
the Court in Richfield Care Center: 
the Commission must consider separate accidents 
serially in order to determine the percentage of 
impairment attributable to each accident and the 
proportion the preexisting impairment bears to the 
total combined impairment. 
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No. 20412, at p. 3. Thus, under this rule, any impairment 
attributable to prior industrial accidents becomes preexisting 
impairment for the purposes of apportioning liability between 
the Second Injury Fund and the employer or carrier at the time 
of the last accident. 
Following the rule and example laid down in the Richfield 
Care Center case in the present matter would result in an 
apportionment of 16% of the benefits paid for the December 5, 
1984 accident to the self-insured Jordan School District and 
84% to the Second Injury Fund. This is simply computed by 
taking the administrative law judge's findings regarding the 
percentages of impairment attributable to each accident along 
with the impairment which preexisted all of the accidents and 
dividing that total into the percentage of impairment 
attributable to the last accident. As Mr. Lamb's impairment 
from conditions preexisting all the accidents in question is 
12.5% and his impairment from the three accidents is 4.5% , 4%, 
and 4% respectively, the percentage of liability attributable 
to the last accident is 4/25 or 16% which is the liability 
chargeable to Jordan School District for benefits paid for the 
December 5, 1984 accident. The other 21/25 or 84% is the 
liability of the Second Injury Fund. The Workers Compensation 
Fund of Utah has no liability for temporary total disability 
compensation paid after the December 5, 1984 accident. 
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More could be said regarding thje application of the 
Richfield Care Center case to the facts of this case, 
especially with regards to the apportiqnment of liability for 
medical expenses made by the Commission. But since the Workers 
Compensation Fund did not have the benefit of that case at the 
time of the proceedings below, no objection was made to the 
manner in which medical benefits werp apportioned. It is 
clear, however, that the medical beneflits chargeable to the 
August 1982 and June 1984 accidents should have been 
apportioned between the Workers Compensation Fund and the 
Second Injury Fund through a separate 4nalYsis as mandated by 
the Court in Richfield Care Center. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION 
AFTER MR. LAMB'S LAST ACCIDENT )CAN BE APPORTIONED 
TO THE WORKERS COMPENSATION FUtjlD, THE MANNER AND 
AMOUNT OF APPORTIONMENT BY T^E COMMISSION WAS 
ERRONEOUS. 
A. UNDER THE RICHFIELD CARE CENTER RULE, THE 
PORTIONS OF TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY AFTER MR. 
LAMB'S LAST ACCIDENT WHICH WERE ATTRIBUTED TO HIS 
PRIOR ACCIDENTS SHOULD HAVE ALSJO BEEN APPORTIONED 
BETWEEN THE WORKERS COMPENSATE 
SECOND INJURY FUND. 
ION FUND AND THE 
In its order granting Jordan School District's motion for 
review, the Industrial Commission opined that if the surgery of 
March 14, 1985 was partially caused by tfhe prior accidents then 
so would be the recovery period after the surgery for which Mr. 
Lamb would receive temporary total disability compensation. 
This, of course, is always the casje in serial accident 
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situations involving aggravations of prior injuries and has 
provided no justification for apportionment in the past, And, 
the Richfield Care Center case indicates that each accident in 
the series is to be viewed separately, implying that the 
subsequent accidents constitute intervening events. If, 
however, the Commission's logic is adopted in order to assess a 
portion of the temporary total disability resulting from the 
March 14, 1985 surgery to the prior accidents, then the 
portions assessed to those accidents should have been subject 
to Second Injury Fund apportionment according to the Richfield 
Care Center ruling. Therefore, since at the time of the 1982 
accident, Mr. Lamb had 12.5% preexisting impairment and 
incurred an additional 4.5% impairment as a result of this 
accident, (R-213) any benefits attributed to this accident 
should be apportioned 4.5/17 or 26% to the Workers Compensation 
Fund and 12.5/17 or 74% to the Second Injury Fund. The same 
type of analysis is required with respect to the June 1984 
accident and results in an apportionment of benefits 
attributable to that accident of 4/21 or 19% to the Workers 
Compensation Fund and 81% to the Second Injury Fund. In the 
Commission's October 23, 1986 order, the Workers Compensation 
Fund was required to pay 34% of the temporary total disability 
compensation attributable to the Surgery of March 14, 1985, but 
no apportionment of the Workers Compensation Fund's liability 
for this amount was made with the Second Injury Fund. 
(R-256.) In failing to do so, the Commission has erred. 
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B. IN ASSESSING PORTIONS OF MR;. LAMB'S TEMPORARY 
TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION TO THE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND THE COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT 
APPLYING THE COMPENSATION RATE IN EFFECT AT THE 
TIME OF THE ACCIDENTS TO WHICH THE COMPENSATION 
WAS APPORTIONED. 
The Industrial Commission's order requiring the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah to pay 34% of the temporary total 
disability compensation associated with Mr. Lamb's surgery of 
March 14, 1985 did not make any adjustment for the compensation 
rates in effect at the time of the prior accidents but was 
based on the weekly compensation rate in effect at the time of 
the December 5, 1984 accident. However, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 35-1-65 (1953, as amended) clearly states that in cases 
of temporary total disability the injure^ worker shall: 
receive 66 and 2/3% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as 
such disability is total, but not more than a 
maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury per week... 
(Emphasis added.) In its order the Commission does not state 
what the weekly rate is that it is basing the temporary total 
disability compensation award on. However, by reference to the 
original order of the administrative law judge, it is obvious 
that the rate is the one attributable tb and in effect at the 
time of the last accident. (R-213.) As indicated by the 
Commission's own published maximum compensation rates 
(Addendum, item 12) and the above quoted statute, any temporary 
total disability compensation attributable to the August 1982 
accident should be paid at a rate not to exceed $284.00 per 
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week and any temporary total disability compensation 
attributable to the June 1984 accident at a rate not to exceed 
$300.00 per week. By ordering otherwise, the Industrial 
Commission exceeded its authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant herein respectfully requests that the Utah 
Court of Appeals provide the relief and find as a matter of law 
as follows: 
1. The order of the Industrial Commission of Utah which 
apportioned liability for Gilbert R. Lamb's disability benefits 
to the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah as the insurance 
carrier for Mr. Lamb's employer at the time of his industrial 
accidents pre-dating his most recent industrial accident should 
be reversed and modified so that Jordan School District and the 
Second Injury Fund share sole responsibility for these 
benefits. There is no statutory authority for the Commission 
to make an apportionment of disability compensation between 
insurance carriers or employers in a multiple accident case and 
the Utah Supreme Court has so held. 
2. In the alternative, if this Court beleives there was 
sufficient authority for the Commission to apportion the 
permanent partial disability compensation attributable to the 
prior accidents, that part of the Commission's order 
apportioning temporary total disability compensation payable 
after the last accident to the Workers Compensation Fund should 
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be reversed and modified so that the selfi-msured Jordan School 
District and the Second Injury Fund share sole liability for 
those benefits. 
3. If, in the alternative, this Cburt believes that the 
Workers Compensation Fund can be held liable for a portion of 
the temporary total disability compensation payable after Mr. 
Lamb's last industrial accident, thei^i the order of the 
Industrial Commission should be modified so that the accidents 
are considered separately for purposes of assessing the Second 
Injury Fund's share of that compensatipn as mandated by the 
Utah Supreme Court's recent decisions anct also modified so that 
any portion assessed to Mr. Lamb's prior accidents is payable 
at the compensation rates in effect ^t the time of those 
accidents. 
DATED this X T day of February, 1987. 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
££AJ~AT. Wm 
Elliot K. Morrisv * 
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ADDENDUM 
ITEM 1 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45 
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35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be 
paid. 
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 wfro is injured, and the 
dependents of every such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of 
or in the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for 
loss sustained on account of the injury or death, andjsuch amount for medi-
cal, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and in case of death, such 
amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility 
for compensation and payment of medical, nursing) L and hospital services 
and medicines, and funeral expenses provided und^r this chapter shall be 
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 52a; C.L. 
1917, § 3113; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 42-1-43; L. 1984, ch. 75, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1984 amend-
ment substituted "as provided in this chap-
the employee. 
ter"in the first sentence for "as is herein pro-
vided"; added thp second sentence; and made 
minor changes in phraseology, punctuation 
and style. 
30 
ADDENDUM 
ITEM 2 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-46 
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35-1-46. Employers to secure workers! 
benefits for employees — Methods 
Notice:—Injunction — Violatio^i. 
compensation 
Failure — 
(1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns, knd school districts, 
shall secure the payment of workers' compensation penefits for their em-
ployees: 
(a) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensa-
tion with the Workers' Compensation Fund of Uiah, which payments 
shall commence within 90 days after any final award by the commisr 
sion; 
(b) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payndent of this compensa-
tion with any stock corporation or mutual association authorized, to 
transact the business of workers' compensation insurance in this state, 
which payments shall commence within 90 days t^fter any final award 
by the commission; 
(c) By furnishing annually to the commission satisfactory proof.of 
financial ability to pay direct compensation in thq amount, in the man-
ner, and when due as provided for in this title, /vjvhich payments shall 
commence within 90 days after any final award tyy ,the commission. In 
these cases the commission may in its discretion Require the deposit; of 
acceptable security, indemnity, or bond to securej the payment of com-
pensation liabilities as they are incurred, and maV'atany time .change 
or modify its findings of fact herein provided for, jtf in its judgment this 
action is necessary or desirable to secure or assume a strict compliance 
with all the provisions of law relating to the payment of compensation 
and the furnishing of medical, nurse, and hospital services, medicines, 
and burial expenses to injured employees and to the dependents • of 
killed employees. The commission may in prober cases'revoke'any 
employer's privilege as a self-insurer. 
(2) The commission is authorized and empowered to maintain a suit in 
any court of the state to enjoin any employer, within the provisions of this 
act, from further operation of the employer's business, where the employer 
has failed to provide for the payment of benefits in oiie of the three ways in 
this section provided. Upon a showing of failure to so provide, the court 
shall enjoin the further operation of the employer's business until the pay-
ment of these benefits has been secured by the employer as required by this 
section. The court may enjoin the employer without) requiring bond from 
the commission. 
If the commission has reason to believe that an employer of one or more 
employees is conducting a business without securing the payment of com-
pensation in one of the three ways provided in this section, the commission 
may give such employer five days' written notice by registered mail of such 
noncompliance and if the employer within said period does not remedy such 
default, the commission may file suit as in this section above provided and 
the court is empowered, ex parte to issue without bodd a temporary injunc-. 
tion restraining the further operation of the employer £ 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 53; C.L. 1917, 
5 3114; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; 1923, ch. 64, 
ft 1; 1925, ch. 80, § 1; U.S. 1933, 42-1-44; L. 
1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-44; L. 1945, 
ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, 
{ 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 3; 1966, ch. 204, § 271; 
1986fch.211,§ 5. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1977 amend-
ment substituted "including" for "except" 
near the beginning of the section; and added 
"which payments shall commence within 90 
days of any final award of the commission" to 
the end of subds. (1) and (2) and to the end of 
the first sentence of subd. (3). 
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 
204, effective July 1, 1986, substituted 
"Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah" for 
"State Insurance Fund" in Subsection (1) and 
made minor stylistic changes. 
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 
211, effective July I, 1986, designated the in-
troductory language as Subsection (1), substi-
tuted "the payment of workers' compensation 
benefits for" for "compensation to" find de-
leted "in one of the following ways" following 
"employees" in Subsection (1); redesignated 
s business. 
former Subsection (1) as present Subsection 
(l)(a) and made stylistic changes therein; re-
designated Subsection (2) as Subsection (1Kb) 
and made stylistic changes therein; redesig-
nated Subsection (3) as Subsection (l)(c) and 
made stylistic changes therein; designated 
the paragraph following Subsection (l)(c) as 
Subsection (2) and in Subsection (2) deleted 
"hereby" before "authorized", substituted 
"provide for the payment of benefits" for 
"insure or keep irjsured", substituted "Upon" 
for "the payment of compensation to injured 
employees, and upon", substituted "so pro-
vide" for "insure" following "failure to", sub-
stituted "the poyinent of these benefits has 
been secured by tpe employer as required by 
this section" for "such time as such insurance 
has been obtained by such employer" and 
made stylistic changes; and deleted the last 
paragraph of the section. 
This section is i»et out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Meaning of "this net". — The phrase 
"this act" in the first paragraph of Subsection 
(2) apparently refers to this chapter. 
ADDENDUM 
ITEM 3 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-65 
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35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of payments — 
State average weekly wage defined. 
lall receive 662/3% of 
the injury so long as 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee s; 
that employee's average weekly wages at the time ofj 
such disability is total, but not more than a maximuih of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a 
minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each 
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a njaximum of four such 
dependent children, not to exceed the average weekly 
at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 100% 
wage of the employee 
of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. In no case shall such 
compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury over q. period of eight years 
from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the em-
ployee reaching a fixed state of recovery, and whejn no such light duty 
employment is available to the employee from the! employer, temporary 
disability benefits shall continue to be paid. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred tojin chapters 1 and 2 of 
this Title shall be determined by the commission a^  follows: on or before 
June 1 of each year, the total wages reported on contribution reports to the 
department of employment security under the commission for the preced-
ing calendar year shall be divided by the averag^ monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported 
for the preceding year by twelve. The average annukl wage thus obtained 
shall be divided by 52, and the average weekly v^age thus determined 
rounded to the nearest dollar. The state average weekly wage as so deter-
mined shall be used as the basis for computing the maximum compensation 
rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease which 
occurred during the twelve-month period commencing July 1 following the 
June 1 determination, and any death resulting therefrom. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3137; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; 1921, ch. 67, 
§ I; U.S. 1933, 42-1-61; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 
1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-61; L. 1945, 
ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, 
S I; 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 
1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 
49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 1967, ch. 65, § 1; 
1969, ch. 86, § 3; 1971, ch. 76, § 4; 1973, ch. 
67, § 2; 1975, ch. 101, § 4; 1977, ch. 151, 
§ 1; 1981, ch. 287, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1975 amend-
ment, in subsec. (1), substituted "100%" for 
M662/3M before "of the state average weekly 
wage" in three places; increased the mini-
mum benefit per week from $35 to $45 in the 
first sentence of subsec. U); and inserted "not 
to exceed the average weekly wage of the em-
ployee at the tin^e of the injury" in the4 first 
sentence of subsejc. (1). 
The 1977 amjendment substituted "that 
employee's" for [his" near the beginning of 
subsec. (1); an i^ substituted "spouse" for. 
"wife" near the njiiddle of subsec. (1). 
The 1981 amendment deleted "minor" 
before "child" a[nd "children" in the'first 
paragraph of subsec. (1); added the last para-
graph in subsec. (1); and made a minor 
change in style. 
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ADDENDUM 
ITEM 4 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-66 
35 
an employee whose 
lly healed and fixed 
application for such 
the disability ends, 
The commission may make a permanent partial disability award at any 
time prior to eight years after the date of injury to Tan e ployee hose 
physical condition resulting from such injury is not finally healed and fixed 
eight years after the date of injury and who files an Application for such 
purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year periocf 
In no case shall the weekly payments continue afterl 
or the death of the injured person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 662/3% of 
that employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not 
more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury per week and not less than a mininjum of $45 per week' 
plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the 
age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children, but not 
to exceed 662/3% of the state average weekly w a g e at tjie time of the injury 
per week, to be paid weekly for the number
 0f weeksj stated against such 
injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the compensation provided 
for temporary total disability and temporary partial disability, to wit: 
For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
(A) Upper extremity 
(1) Arm 
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation) 218 
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion 187 
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow jointj at elbow joint, or * 
below elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon ... 178 
(d) P orearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon .. 168 
(2) Hand 
(a) At wrist or midcarpai or midmetacarpal amputation 168 
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joints 101 
(3) Thumb 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of 
carpometacarpal bone L 67 
(b) At interphalangeai joint [ 50 
(4) Index Vinger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal 
bone . 4 2 
(b) At proximal interphalangeai joint.... 34 
(c) At distal interphalangeai joint j 18 
(5) Middle finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with reseciion of metacarpal 
bone 34 
(b) At proximal interphalangeai joint 27 
(c) At distal interphalangeai joint J 15 
(6) Ring finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal 
bone 17 
(b) At proximal interphalangeai joint 13 
(c) At distal interphalangeai joint j 8 
(7) Little finger T 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal*. 
bone , . i 8 
(b) At proximal interphalangeai joint , 6; 
(c) At distal interphalangeai joint 4 
(B) Lower extremity 
(1) Leg 
(a) Llemipel vectomy (leg, hip and pelvis) , 156 
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of 
ischium 125 
(c) Leg above knee with functional sturnp, at knee joint or Gritti-
Stokes amputation or below knee with jshort stump (three 
inches or less below intercondylar notch) . .1 112 
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump I , 88 
(2) Foot 
(a) Footatankle , .88 
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's)
 ( 66 
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation ,
 4. 44 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone ; 26 
For the loss of: Number ol Weeksi 
(i i) At metatarsophalangeal joint o,,.
 9 a , o.... 16 
(iii) At interphalangeal joint .'. »•. •. i '12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd *— 5th) 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone .. .'Wl4 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint * . 3 
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint » 12 
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint « • ......: >••.:* 4 1* 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints . . , . . . , 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation , .,.< ..*.*. 120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye .................. 100 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing ..., . , , . . . . . . .100 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss 
of the member. Partial loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the 
complete loss or loss of use of the member. This paragraph, however, shall 
not apply to the items listed (B) (4). 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident Bhall be determined and paid 
as follows: 
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in 
decibels with frequencies of 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per second 
(cps) using pure tone air conduction audiometric instruments (ANSI 1,969). 
approved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement: 
of hearing impairment. Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above, 
3000 cycles per second shall not be considered in determining compensable; 
disability. If the average decibel loss at 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles! 
per second is 25 decibels or less, usually no hearing impairment'exists.,1 
"Presbycusis" is defined as hearing loss common to persons of advanced* 
age and is considered to be due to general environment rather than indus-
trial conditions. 
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical 
professionals appointed by the commission shall measure the loss in each 
ear at the four frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per«second' 
which shall be added together and divided by four to determine the average 
decibel loss. To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear,' the 
average decibel loss for. each decibel of loss exceeding 25 decibels shall be, 
multiplied by 11/2% up to the maximum of 100% which is reached }at 92 
decibels. 
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying.the percentage of 
hearing loss in the better ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing 
loss in the poorer ear and dividing by six. The resulting figure is the. per°'( 
centage of binaural hearing loss. Compensation for permanent partial disa-
bility for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the 
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percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefitsf 
as provided in this chapter. Where an employee files one or more claims for 
hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist shall 
be deducted from any subsequent award by th0 commission. In no event 
shall compensation benefits be paid for total or }. 00% binaural hearing loss 
exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits. 
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bojlily function not otherwise 
provided for herein, such period of compensation as the commission shall 
deem equitable and in proportion as near as rr^ ay be to compensation for 
specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this Section but not exceeding in 
any case 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period of compensation 
for permanent total loss of bodily function. 
The amounts specified in this section are all Subject to the limitations as 
to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, and in \ 
no event shall more than a maximum of 662/3%iof the state average weekly, 
wage at the time of the injury for a total of 31!^ weeks in compensation be \ 
required to be paid. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 77; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3138; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 
42-1-62; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, 
§ 1; C. 2943, 42-1-62; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 
1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 
57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 
1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 
68, § 1; 1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 4; 
1971, ch. 76, § 5; 1973, ch. 67, § 3; 1977, ch. 
151, § 2; 1977, ch. 156, § 5; 1981, ch. 287, 
§ 3; 1983, ch. 357, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1977 amend-
ment by chapter 151 substituted "spouse" for 
"wife" in the former first and present third 
paragraphs; and made minor changes in 
phraseology. 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made 
the same changes as the 1977 amendment by 
chapter 151; and in the present third para-
graph increased the minimum compensation 
from $35 to $45 per week. 
The 1981 amendment deleted a beginning 
paragraph which read: "Where the injury 
causes partial disability for work, the em-
ployee shall receive, during such disability 
for not to exceed 312 weeks over a period of 
not to exceed eight years from the date of the 
injury, compensation equal to 662/3% of the 
difference between that employee's average 
weekly wages before the accident and the 
weekly wages that employee is able to earn 
thereafter, but no more than a maximum of 
662/3% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury per week and in addi-
tion theretp $5 for a dependent spouse and $5„ 
for each dependent minor child under the age 
of eighteeh years, up to a maximum of four 
such dependent minor children,'but not to ex-:J 
ceed 662/3^ > of the state average weekly wage 
at the tim£ of the injury per week"; deleted'a' 
former thijrd paragraph which read: I^n case \ 
the partial disability begins alter a period of, 
total disability, the period of total, disability, 
shall be deducted from the total period of' 
compensation"; deleted "minor" before ] 
"child" an^ "children" in the first sentence of. 
the third paragraph; inserted "and temporary 
partial disability'' in the first sentence of the 
third paragraph; and made minor changes in 
phraseology. I 
The 19$3 amendment inserted "and 3000" 
and substituted'"(ANSI 1969)" for" "(ASA 
1951)" injthe first sentence of the fifth para-j 
graph; substituted "3000" in the second sen-
tence of t$e fifth paragraph for "2000"; added 
the third Sentence of the fifth paragraph; sub-
stituted "jfour" in two places for "three"< and 
inserted fand 3000" in the first sentence of 
the seven|th paragraph; deleted a second sen-
tence in the seventh paragraph which read:! 
"To allowl for presbycusis, there shall be dev 
ducted frQm the average decibel loss V2 a dec-
ibel for e^ch year of the employee's age over 
forty at tfee time of the accident"; deleted !'(af*l 
ter deduction of the loss in decibels for pres-j 
bycusis)"! after "ear," substituted "25 deci-
bels" for j "fifteen decibels," and substituted' 
"82 decibels" for "92 decibels" in the second! 
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35-J-GO. Combined injuries resulting in permanent inca-
pacity — Payment out of Second Injury Fund 
— Training of employee. 
U) if any employee who has previously incurred a permanent incapacity 
by accidental injury, disease, or congenital causes, sustains an ' indust r ia l 
injury for which either compensation or medical care, or both, is provided 
by this chapter that results in permanent incapacity which is substantial ly 
greater than he would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing 
incapacity, or which aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-existing inca-
pacity, compensation, medical care, and other reflated items as outlined in 
Section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, but 
the liability of the employer for such compensation, medical care, and other 
related items shall be for the industrial injury only. The remainder shall be 
paid out of the Second Injury Fund provided for in Subsection 36-1-68 .(1), 
and shall be determined after assigning the impairment for the industrial 
injury on a whole person uncombined basis and then deducting this per-
centage from the total combined rating. This combined impairment ra t ing 
may not exceed IUU%. . 
Fur purposes of this section, (a) any aggravation ol a pre-existing injury, 
disease, or congenital cause shall be deemed "substantially greater",1 and, 
compensation, medical care, and other related items shall be awarded on 
the basis of the combined injuries as provided in this Subsection (1), and (b) 
where there is no such aggravation, no award for combined injuries may be 
made unless the percentage of permanent physical impairment a t t r ibut-
able to the industrial injury is 1U% or greater and the percentage of perma-
nent physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions, includ-
ing the industrial injury, is greater than 20%. iJi determining the impair- . , 
ment thresholds and assessment of liability in favor of the employee and 
apportionment between the carrier or employer and the Second Injury 
Fund, the permanent physical impairment at tr ibutable to the industrial 
injury or the pre-existing condition or overall impairment, shall be consid-
ered on a whole person uncombined basis. If ihe pre-exiBting incapacity 
referred to in this Subsection (1Kb) previously has been compensated for, in 
whole or in part, as a permanent partial disability under this chapter or 
Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, such 
compensation shall be deducted from the liability assessed to the Second 
Injury Fund under this paragraph. 
If the payment of temporary disability benefits, medical expenses, or 
other related items are required as a result of the industrial injury subject 
to this section, the employer or its insurance carlrier shall be responsible for 
all such temporary benefits, medical care, or other related items up to the 
end of the period of temporary total disability resulting from the industrial 
injury. Any allocation of disability benefits, medical care, or other related 
items following such period shall be made bejtween the employer or its 
insurer and the Second Injury Fund as provided for in this section, and any 
payments made by the employer or its insurance carrier in excess of its 
proportionate share shall be recoverable at the time of the award for com-
bined disabilities if any is made. ' 
A medical panel having the qualifications of the medical panel set forth 
in Section 35-2-56, shall review all medical aspects of the case and deter-
mine first, the total permanent physical impairment resulting from all 
causes and conditions including the industrial injury; second, the percent-
age of permanent physical impairment at tr ibutable to the industrial in-
jury; and third, the percentage of permanent physical impairment at t r ibut-
able to the previously existing condition, whether due to accidental injury, 
disease, or congenital causes. The Industrial Commission shall then assess 
the liability lor permanent partial disability compensation and future med-
ical care to the employer on the basis of the percentage of permanent physi-
cal impairment attr ibutable to the industrial injury only and any amounte 
remaining to be paid shall be payable out of the Second injury Fund. Medi-
cal expenses shall be paid in the first instance by the employer or its 
insurance carrier. Amounts, if any, which have been paid by the employer 
in excess of the portion attributable to the industrial injury shall be reim-
bursed to the employer out of the Second injury Fund upon writ ten request 
and verification of amounts so expended. 
(2) The commission may increase the weekly compensation rates to be 
paid out of this special fund. This increase shall be used for the rehabilita-
tion and training of any employee coming under this chapter as may be 
certified to the commission by the Rehabilitation Department of the State 
Board of Education as being eligible for rehabilitation and training. There 
may not be paid out of such special fund for rehabilitation an amount in 
excess of $1,000. 
History: L. 1917, ch . 100, § 79; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3140, s u b s e c . 6; L. 1921, eh . 67, § 1; I l .S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-G5; L. 1945, ch . 65, § 1; 
1955, ch . 57, § 1; 1957, ch . 62, § 1; 1959, ch . 
55, § 1; 1963, ch . 49, § 1; 1965, ch . 68, § 1; 
1969, ch . 86, § 7; 1973, ch . 67, § 6; 1981, ch . 
287, § 4; 1984, ch . 79, § 1. 
Compi le r ' s Notes . — The 1981 amend-
ment substi tuted "either compensation or 
medical care, or both" in the first paragraph 
of subsec. (1) for "compensation and medical 
care"; inserted "or which aggravates or is ag-
gravated by such pre-existing incapacity" in 
the first paragraph of subsec. (1); substituted 
"compensation, medical care and other 
related items as outlined" in the first para-
graph of subsec. (1) for "compensation and 
medical care, which medical care and other 
related items are outlined"; inserted "and 
other related i tems" before "shall be" in the 
first paragraph of subsec. (1); substituted 
"second injury fund" in the first and last 
paragraphs of subsec. (1) for "special fund"; 
deleted "hereinafter referred to as the 'special 
fund"' at the end of the first paragraph of 
Fubsec. (i); inserted the second and third 
paragraphs of subsec. (1); inserted "perma-
nent partial disability" in the second sen-
tence of the last paragraph of subsec. (1); in-
serted "future" in the second sentence of the 
last paragraph of subsec. (1); subst i tuted 
"any amounts remaining to be paid hereun-
der" in the second sentence of the last para-
graph of subsec. (1) for "the remainder"; in-
serted the provisions of the present third sen-
tence of the fourth paragraph of subsec. (1); 
inserted "upon written request and verifica-
tion of amounts so expended" in the last sen-
tence of the last paragraph of subsec. (1); and 
made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation. 
The 1984 amendment substi tuted "chap-
ter" for "title" in the first sentence of subsec. 
(1); added "and shall be determined after as-
signing the impairment for the industrial in-
jury on a whole person uncombined basis and 
then deducting this percentage from the total 
combined rat ing" to the second sentence of 
subsec. (1); added the third sentence to 
subsec. (1); inserted the second sentence in 
the second paragraph of subsec. (1); and sub-
stituted "this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35" 
for "this act or" in the third sentence of the 
second paragraph of subsec. (1); and made 
minor changes in phraseology, punctuat ion, 
and style. 
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35-1-53. Tax on employers and counties, cities, townsr x>r r 
school districts paying compensation direct. 
(1) Employers who by authority of the commission are authorized to'pay. 
compensation direct shall pay annually, on or before March 1, a tax of the>. 
same percentage as required by law to be paid by insurance companies> 
upon their premiums, based upon an amount equivalent to premiums, 
which would be paid by such employer, if insured in the Workers' Compen-
sation Fund of Utah; said tax to be computed and collected by the State Tax 
Commission and paid by it into the state treasury as provided in Subsection 
•31A-3-20K2). 
(2) Every county, city, town, or school district which elects to pay com-
pensation direct shall pay annually to the State Tax Commission for pay-
ment to the state treasurer to the credit of the special fund provided for in 
Subsection 35-1-68 (1) and as provided in Subsection 31A-3-201 (2), on or 
before March 1, an amount equal to the same percentage as required by law 
to be paid by insurance companies writing workmen's compensation and 
occupational disease disability insurance upon their premiums, based upon 
an amount equivalent to the premiums which would be paid by that em-
ployer if insured in the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah. 
(3) The State Tax Commission shall have access to all the records of the 
office of the Industrial Commission for the purpose of computing and col-
lecting any amounts described in this section. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 64; C.L. 1917, The 1986 amendment, effective July 1, 
§ 3125; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1986, throughout the section, substituted 
1943, 42-1-51; L. 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1971, ch. "Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah" for 
76, § 2; 1981, ch. 145, § 3; 1985, ch. 242, "State Insurance , Fund" and "Subsection, 
§ 34; 1986, ch. 204, § 275. 31A-3-201 (2)" for "Section 31-14-4 (3)"; in 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1981 amend- Subsection (1), deleted the last sentence, 
ment substituted "March 1" in subsecs. (1) which provided: tThe provisions of Section 
and (2) for "the first day of September in each 31-14-4 (6) shall nfc>t apply in the case of taxes» 
year"; and added the last sentence to subsec. paid under this section/', and made minor 
(1). stylistic changes. 
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(2) (a) Every admitted insurer writing workers' compensation insurance 
in this state, including the Workers' Compensation fund of Utah under 
Chapter 3, Title 35, shall pay to the state tax commission! on or before 
March 31 in each year, a tax of between 3l/*% and 31/H% of the total 
premiums received by it from workers' compensation insurance in this 
state during the preceding calendar year. The percentage of premium 
applicable in any given year shall be determined by the Industrial 
. Commission at least 90 days prior to the payment date, and any per-
centage of premium over 3l/4% shall reflect the reasonable reserves 
necessary to maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund provided for in 
§ 35-1-107 in an actuarially sound financial condition. This taxable 
premium shall be reduced in the same manner as provided in Subsec-
tions (l)(a) and (1Kb), but not as provided in Subsection (l)(c). The 
State Tax Commission shall remit from the tax collected under this 
subsection an amount equal to 3% of the premium jto the Second Injury 
Fund created under Subsection 35-1-68(1), lU% of the premium to the 
General Fund, and any remaining applicable percentage of the pre-
mium to the Uninsured Employers' Fund created \inder § 35-1-107. No 
tax that is to be transferred into the General Fund may be collected on 
premiums received from Utah public agencies. 
(b) Effective July 1, 1987, the variable tax presided in Subsection 
(2)(a) shall be replaced by a flat tax of dlU%. 
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*
A THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ^ JTAH 
Case Nos. 85000257, 85000508, 85000509, and 85000510 
GILBERT R. LAMB, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT 
(self-insured) and/or 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
(formerly State Insurance Fund) and/or 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
cbNCLUSlONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial) Commission of Utah, 160 
East Broadway, Salt Lake Citjy, Utah, on September 30, 
1985, at 8:30 a.m.; same bejLng pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
Timothy C. Allent. Administrative Law Judge. 
The Applicant was preserit and represented by 
Ronald L. Dunn, Attorney at LJaw. 
The Defendant Jordan School District was represented 
by William Bannon, Attorney at Law. 
The Workers* Compensation £und was represented by 
Elliot K. Morris, Attorney at Law. 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the medical issues and questions 
Administrative Law Judge, 
were distributed to the 
were submitted to a Medical Panel appointed by the 
The Medical Panel Report was received, and copies 
parties. The. Administrative Law Judge requested a clarification, and 
following receipt of the clarification of the Medical Panel Report, it was 
submitted to the parties. No objections having been received to the clarified 
response of the Panel or the Medical Panel Report, the Medical Panel Report 
and the clarification are admitted into evidence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Gilbert R. Lamb was employed by Jordan! School District as an 
electrician in their maintenance shop. On November 18, 1980, Mr. Lamb was in 
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the shop warehouse looking for an electrical motor. In order to look on the 
bottom shelf, the Applicant was straddled over a motor which was approximately 
2 1/2 feet tall. As he twisted to look on the lower shelf, he felt a pop in 
his back and had immediate pain which radiated down his legs to the back of 
his knees. The warehouseman that was present helped the Applicant stand up, 
and he was able to finish the shift with back pain, since his leg pain had 
subsided. He completed an accident report and saw his family physician, 
Dr. Haymes, that evening and was given muscle relaxants for a back sprain. 
The following morning Mr. Lamb was sore but was able to return to work. After 
three days of muscle relaxants he was much improved and had no further 
problems. 
In approximately 1960 Mr. Lamb was working for Central Electric in 
Santa Maria, California. As a result he hurt his back and was required to 
report to an emergency room for treatment. He was given a Cortisone injection 
which improved his condition. He had no further problems with his back until 
the injury of November 18, 1980. 
On August 10, 1982, Mr. Lamb was working on the lights in a swimming 
pool at a middle school. He was required to climb up and down a ladder into 
the swimming pool, and he was also climbing into a tunnel which ran around the 
perimeter of the pool. On one of these occasions the Applicant was climbing 
out of the^pool, and as he swung his ^ eg over j^ he side, he had a knife-like 
sharp paii*~in his low back and down his legs. Mr. Lamb had to be assisted out 
of the pool. He filled out an accident report and then took it easy for the 
rest of the shift. That evening as he was walking into his house, his legs 
buckled and he fell to the ground. He was taken to the Alta View Emergency 
Room and after receiving x-rays was seen by Dr. Edward Spencer. Dr. Spencer 
informed the Applicant that he had spondylolysis and spondylolisthesis and a 
muscle sprain. Dr. Spencer made an appointment for the Applicant to see him 
for follow-up treatment. The Applicant "chickened out*' and instead went to 
see Dr. Allan Billeter, since he had received chiropractic treatments from him 
twenty or thirty years prior to that occasion. The Applicant indicated that 
he had received chiropractic treatments in the past and that as a result he 
had been able to return to work. On August 16, 1982, he was seen by 
Dr. Billeter and received approximately five chiropractic adjustments. On 
September 15 he was sent to the Cottonwood Hospital by Dr. Haymes for x-rays 
and a CT scan.. The Applicant lost four days from work as a result of this 
injury. He returned to work and continued to work without problems until 
about a month later, when he noticed some back pain. However, he did not take 
any medication for the pain but, rather, kept working. He reported no further 
problems with his back, and he stated that in June of 1984 his back felt great. 
On June 14, 1984, Mr. Lamb was working on a rooftop heating and air 
conditioning unit at Brighton High School. As part of this work they were 
changing a shaft weighing approximately fifteen pounds. The Applicant was 
carrying this five-foot shaft on his shoulder when he had to jump approximately 
3 1/2 feet down from one roof to another. As he did so, his left foot slipped 
upon his landing, and he caught himself so as not to damage the shaft. 
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However, when he did so, he felt a pain in his low back between his shoulder 
blades. He advised his supervisor that he had hurt his back, and he was 
instructed to see a doctor. Since the Applicant nad seen Dr. McClean for 
chiropractic adjustments on his neck a few days prior, he called his office. 
However, the doctor was out of town on vacation, so he was seen by Dr. Egbert 
for chiropractic adjustments until Dr. McClean returned. The Applicant then 
resumed treatments with Dr. McClean in late June of 1984 and was able to 
continue working as a result of the adjustments for the rest of the summer. 
On December 5, 1984, the Applicant had gorie to the shop to get his 
work orders for the day. As he was walking in the parking lot to his truck, 
he slipped on some ice but was able to catch himself on the front end of a 
pickup. However, in doing so he wrenched his back and felt a pain. Since he 
felt he had an easy morning, he decided to go on to work. He reported to the 
Jordan High School maintenance department to see what the job there involved. 
He was informed that he would be checking on some lights, so he had a helper 
there at the school that could carry his ladder. Mr. Lamb could hardly climb 
the ladder, so he returned to the main shop and told his foreman that he was 
having problems with his back. He filled out an accident report and then 
helped with some paperwork in the office until nooi^ . At that time his wife 
came and picked him up. 
Glekn 
Db 
The Applicant returned to work the following 
was in suchextreme pain, he was only-able to work 
informed his "foreman that he would need tcrsee a dtftitor 
and called Dr. Lancaster. The doctor was not in, so 
his office the following day, December 7, 1984, for a 
Dr. Lancaster instructed the Applicant to see Dr 
at his back clinic. The Applicant was informed by 
the doctor would not be able to see him for approximately 
so Mr. Lamb returned to Dr. McClean for chiropracti 
of January 1985. As a result of the adjustments, 
and he was only having pain in his hips. However, 
have a recurrence of leg pain. The adjusting fi|rm 
District terminated the Applicant's chiropractic 
and also terminated his temporary total disability 
morning, but because he 
approximately one hour. He 
and he then went home 
the Applicant reported to 
chiropractic adjustment. 
Momberger for treatment 
Momberger's office that 
two weeks or longer, 
treatments until the end 
leg pain was eliminated 
if he bent over, he would 
for the Jordan School 
in January of 1985 
January 31, 1985. 
Arrangements were then made for the Applicant 
for an independent medical examination. Dr. Morrow 
February 8, 1985, and at that time advised that 
surgery. Thereafter the Applicant was referred to 
Associates for a CT scan, and he was then referred 
a discogram, which he received on February 28, 
Applicant was admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital 
following day Dr. Morrow performed a lumbar discectimy 
an interbody fusion. The Applicant apparently had an 
in July of 1985 he was referred to Alan Bluth for phy 
his 
treatments 
effective 
to see Dr. Robert Morrow 
saw the Applicant on 
he would require back 
the Western Neurological 
to Cottonwood Hospital for 
1985. On March 13 the 
for back surgery. On the 
at L4-5 and L6-S1 with 
uneventful recovery, and 
sical therapy. 
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The Applicant's present complaints are that he has back pain and some 
leg pain. 
Because of the denial of liability for the surgery of March 14, 1985, 
the file was referred to a Medical Panel for its evaluation. The Medical 
Panel found that the Applicant reached a fixed state of recovery following the 
industrial accident of December 5, 198A, approximately nine months after his 
surgery of March 14, 1985. The Panel also found that the surgery in question 
was necessitated by the Applicant's preexisting conditions and all of the 
industrial injuries he sustained at Jordan School District. The Panel found 
that the Applicant has sustained a 12.5 percent permanent partial impairment 
due to preexisting back problems, and they found 12.5 percent due to the 
industrial injuries of December 5, 1984; June 14, 1984; and August 10, 1982, 
with the injury of August 10 being the " . . • foremost in causing his ongoing 
symptoms . . . ." The Panel also determined that the preexisting conditions 
were aggravated by each of the Applicant's industrial accidents. Finally, the 
Panel opined that the Applicant " . . . may require additional surgery in the 
future related to the graft instability." The Administrative Law Judge adopts 
the findings of the Medical Panel as his own. 
Pursuant to the findings of the Medical Panel* the Applicant is 
entitled to additional temporary total disability resulting from the 
industrial accident of December 5, 1984, for the period February 1, 1985, 
through December 14, 1985, or a -period'o£> 45 weeks^and two days. At the time 
of his industrial accident of December 5, 1984, the Applicant was earning 
wages sufficient to entitle him to the maximum award of $310.00 per week in 
benefits. In reviewing the file, the Administrative Law Judge notes that the 
Jordan School District paid the Applicant temporary total disability compensa-
tion for this accident at the rate of $306.58 per week for 8.143 weeks for the 
period December 6, 1984, through January 31, 1985. This compensation rate was 
in error, since the Applicant was entitled to the maximum rate of $310.00 per 
week, thereby resulting in an underpayment of $3*42 per week for 8.143 weeks 
or a total underpayment of $27.85. Further, pursuant to Section 78 of the 
Workers' Compensation Act, the Applicant is entitled to interest of 8 percent 
per annum compounded weekly on the temporary total disability compensation 
benefits due and owing him for the above-referenced period, which equals an 
additional award of $1,297.05* With respect to permanent partial impairment 
for the industrial accident of December 5, 1984, the Applicant is entitled to 
12*48 weeks of permanent impairment benefits payable at the statutory maximum 
of $207.00 per week for a total of $2,583.36, for a 4 percent impairment of 
the whole person due to that industrial accident* Finally, Jordan School 
District (self-insured) shall also be liable for 4/25 or 16 percent of the 
expenses of the surgery of March 14, 1985, and any future medical expenses 
incurred by Gilbert R. Lamb. Jordan School District shall pay the 16 percent 
share to the Workers' Compensation Fund. 
The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay the Applicant 12.48 
weeks of permanent partial impairment benefits at the rate of $200.00 per week 
for a total of $2,496.00, as compensation for a 4 percent permanent partial 
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impairment resulting from the industrial accident of June 14, 1984. The 
Workers* Compensation Fund shall also pay 4/25 or 46 percent of the expenses 
incurred as the result of the surgery of March JL4, 1985, and any future 
medical expenses incurred by Gilbert R. Lamb. Finally, the Workers' 
Compensation Fund shall also be responsible for 14.04 weeks of permanent 
partial impairment benefits payable at the statutory maximum of $189.00 per 
week for a total of $2,653.56, as compensation foi* a 4.5 percent permanent 
partial impairment resulting from the industrial accident of August 10, 1982. 
The Administrative Law Judge is mindful that the Medical Panel divided the 
injuries equally; however, to effectuate the finding of the Panel that the 
injury of August 10, 1982, contributed more than the other injuries, and to 
insure that the full 12.5 percent is awarded, the Administrative Law Judge has 
attributed this rating to the injury of August 10, 1982. Therefore, the 
Workers1 Compensation Fund shall also be liable for 4.5/25 or 18 percent of 
the expenses as a result of the surgery of March 14, 1985, and any future 
medical expenses incurred by Gilbert R. Lamb. Pursuant to Section 69 of the 
Act, the Workers* Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay the expenses of the 
surgery of March 14, 1985, and any future medical expenses incurred by Gilbert 
R. Lamb in full in the first instance, and they shall then be entitled to 
reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for 50 percent of those expenses, 
and they shall also be entitled to reimbursement f^om Jordan School District 
(self-insured) for 16 percent of those expenses. 
The^Second Injury Fund shall^pay^the Applicant 39 weeks of permanent 
partial impairment benefits at "the rate of $207.GO per week for a total of 
$8,073.00, as compensation for a 12.5 permanent partial impairment of the 
whole person due to preexisting conditions. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Gilbert R. Lamb is entitled to workers' compensation benefits as set 
forth hereinabove. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Jordan School District (self-insured) 
pay Gilbert R. Lamb the sum of $27.85, which amount represents the underpayment 
of temporary total disability benefits to him as a result of his industrial 
accident of December 5, 1984. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jordan School District (self-insured) pay 
Gilbert R. Lamb compensation at the rate of $310.00 per week for 45.286 weeks 
for a total of $14,038.66, as compensation for temporary total disability for 
the period February 1, 1985, through December 14, 1985. The foregoing 
benefits shall be paid in a lump sum less the attorney's fee to be awarded 
hereinafter. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jordan School District (self-insured) pay 
Michael J. Mazuran, attorney for the Applicant, the sum of $5,226.68 for 
services rendered in his matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid 
award to the Applicant and remitted directly to his office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jordan School District (self-insured) pay 
Gilbert R. Lamb the sum of $1,297.05, which amount represents 8 percent 
interest as of August 23, 1986, on the temporary total disability benefits 
previously awarded to him, the same to be paid in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jordan School District (self-insured) pay 
Gilbert R. Lamb compensation at the rate of $207.00 per week for 12.48 weeks 
for a total of $2,583.36 as compensation for a 4 percent permanent partial 
impairment resulting from the industrial accident of December 5, 1984. The 
foregoing benefits shall be paid in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jordan School District and/or the Workers' 
Compensation Fund pay Gilbert R. Lamb compensation at the rate of $200.00 per 
week for 12.48 weeks for a total of $2,496.00, as compensation for a 4 percent 
permanent partial impairment due to the industrial accident of June 14, 1984. 
The foregoing shall be paid in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jordan School District and/or the Workers' 
Compensation JPund pay Gilbert R. Lamb -cojQpensation^at the rate of $189.00 per 
week for 1^04 weeks for a total of $2,653.56, as compensation for a 
4.5 percent permanent partial impairment due to the industrial accident of 
August 10, 1982. The foregoing benefits shall commence effective June 8, 
1986, with accrued amounts due and owing in a lump sum, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay 
in full all medical expenses incurred as a result of the. surgery of March 14, 
1985, and any future medical expenses incurred by Gilbert R. Lamb as a result 
of his industrial injuries. The Workers' Compensation Fund shall then be 
entitled to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for 50 percent of such 
expenses paid on behalf of Mr. Lamb, and they shall also be entitled to 
reimbursement from Jordan School District (self-insured) for 16 percent of 
said expenses incurred on behalf of the Applicant. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer to pay 
Gilbert R. Lamb compensation at the rate of $207.00 per week for 39 weeks or a 
total of $8,073.00, as compensation for a 12.5 percent permanent partial 
impairment due to preexisting conditions. The foregoing benefits shall 
commence effective September 14, 1986. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
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specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to Review or appeal. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
-Jr.JL; day of August, 1986. 
ATTEST: 
/s/ Linda J, Strasburg 
Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on August ^C 1986
 f a copy of the attached Order 
in the case of Gilbert R. Lamb issued August .j?/ 1986, was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
P.O, Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580 
Robert A, Burton, Attorney at Law 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Gilbert R. Lamb 
8750 South 700 East 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Michael J. Mazuran, Attorney at Law 
100 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Elliot K. Morris, Attorney at Law 
Workers* Compensation Fund of Utah 
P.O. Box 45420 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0420 
Smith Administrators 
P.O. Box 6123 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By A; LL„_ W . syi„»dh, 
DeAnn S. Smith 
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Blame C. Palmer, Director 
Rodney C. Smith, Assistant Director 
560 South 300 East 
st Office Box 45420 
alt Lake City, Utah 84145-0420 
vvorKers post office BOX 45420 
Compensation 
FunaSL 
August 2>, 15<8e 
Timothy C. Allen 
Administrative Law Judge 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580 
Re: Gilbert Lamb 
WCF File Nos: 84-14721 Inj: 06-14-84 J 
82-21176 Inj: 08-10-82^ 
80-39579 Inj: 11-18-80y 
Empl: Jordan School District 
Dear Judge Allen: 
We are in receipt of a copy of the Findings of jFact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order which you have entered in the above referenced matter. Please 
consider this letter to be the Workers Compensation Fund1s Motion For Review 
of those Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
As you are aware, the cases of Mountain States, Steel Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 535 P.2d 1249, and Duaine Brown Chevrolet ~. Industrial 
Commission, 29 Utah 2d 478, 511 P.2d 743, stand for the proposition that 
compensation benefits cannot be apportioned among insurance carriers in 
multiple accident cases. As you also know, the Utah Supreme Court restricted 
the application of these two cases by refusing to apply the principles 
ennunciated in Brown and Mountain States to apportionment of medical 
benefits. This occurred in United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah (Anderton), 657 P.2d 7^4. However, presumably, 
Brown and Mountain States Steel are still the la|v of the State of Utah 
regarding the apportionment of disability compensation benefits between 
insurance carriers in multiple accident cases. 
I have, on occasion, raised this issue in th^ context of other cases 
which have been adjudicated before the Commission in recent months. However, 
no case has presented such a clear set of facts for the application of 
Mountain States and Duaine Brown as has this case. Therefore, in discussion 
with my colleagues here at the Workers Compensation Fund, we have decided to 
pursue this Motion For Review in order to obtain clarification from either 
the Commission or the Supreme Court as to when and if the Brown and Mountain 
States rulings still apply to multiple accident cased. 
Another administrative law judge has cited to me David v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 649 P.2d 82 as authority for apportionment of 
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compensation benefits between carriers in multiple accident rases. However, 
a careful reading of the David case seems to inaicr.te that whet occurred in 
that matter was not so much an apportionment of compensation as it was an 
award of permanent partial impairment compensation for two distinct accidents 
which had independently resulted in their own ratable impairments. This 
seems to be factually distinguishable 'Tom the situation presented in 
Gilbert Lamb's case and also in the Brown una Mountain States Steel cases 
where there are a series of accidents which finally result in the need for 
surgery which thereafter leaves the applicant in an impaired condition. I 
believe a careful reading of the medical panel report and Findings of Fact in 
the case at hand will show that there is no factual difference between 
Gilbert Lamb's situation and those of the applicants in the Mountain States 
Steel and Duaine Brown cases. 
Based on the foregoing, the Workers Compensation Fund hereby moves for a 
review and/or re-consideration of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order in this matter. Specifically, we would assert, based upon the case 
authority previously cited, that the permanent partial disability sustained 
by the applicant through a series of incidents from 1982 through December 5, 
1984 should be the responsibility of the insurance carrier or employer at the 
time of the last accident. Because of the restriction of the application of 
Brown and Mountain States Steel indicated by the Court in Anderton, the 
Workers Compensation Fund has no objection to the apportionment of medical 
expenses as set forth in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
I have attached to this letter and Motion For Review copies of the Brown, 
Mountain States Steel, Anderton, and David cases for your convenience in 
analyzing our position. We appreciate your consideration of our views in 
this matter and look forward to receiving the Commission's response. 
Very truly yours, 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
Elliot K. Morris 
Attorney at Law 
EKM/jf 
Enclosure 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on Ao<* c s ^ 3<? » 1986, a copy of the attached 
letter to Judge T.C. Allen dated 08-27-86
 was mailed to the following 
person(s) at the following addresses): 
Erie V. Boorman 
Adm. of Second Injury Fund 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Robert A. Burton 
Attorney at Law 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84lfcl 
Michael J. Mazuran 
Attorney at Law 
100 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84lU 
Smith Administrators 
P.O. Box 6123 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
By Jahet Fushimi 
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Robert A. Burton, #516 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Jordan School District (self-insured) 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
GILBERT R. LAMB, j 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, ; 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, and ] 
SECOND INJURY FUND, ] 
Defendants. ] 
i . • 
) MOTION FOR REVIEW OF 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) AND QRDER 
l Case No. 84-14721-C5 
Defendant Jordan School District (belf-insured) objects 
to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lav? and Order entered by 
the Industrial Commission on August 20, 1986, and pursuant to 
35-1-82.53 Utah Code Annotated, moves the Commission to review, 
modify and change the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order. 
Specifically, the Findings, Conclusions and Order should 
be modified to reflect that the Jordan School District (self-
insured) is only obligated to ultimately be&r the cost of 16% of 
the temporary total disability awarded to Gilbert R. Lamb, 
interest on that 16%, and 16% of the total attorneys1 fee award. 
The Jordan School District should be reimbursed for any amounts 
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it has paid in excess of this percentage by the Second injury 
Fund and the Workers1 Compensation Fund. It is submitted that it 
was error for the Industrial Commission to order the Jordan 
School District (self-insured) to assume full r2sponcibility for 
the temporary total disability payments, attorneys1 fees of 
$5,226.68, and interest of $1,297.05, without a right of 
reimbursement. 
The bases for this motion are discussed in detail in the 
accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion to Review. 
Dated t h i s v3 day of vSepp i J^ f 1986. 
STRpRG & H. 
Robert A. mirton 
Attorneys for Defendant Jordan 
School District (self-insured) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 'J day of 
^JOXr ixUhCt . 1986, a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of the fo rego ing 
Motion for Review of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
P. 0. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Gilbert R. Lamb 
8750 South 700 East 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
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Michael J. Mazuran 
Attorney at Law 
LARSEN, MAZURAN & VERHAAREN 
100 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Elliott K. Morris 
Attorney at Law 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
P. 0. Box 45420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0420 
Smith Administrators 
P. 0. Box 6123 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UlJAH 
CASE No, 
* 
OIL&ERT fc. IAMB, * 
* 
Applicant, * bRDER DENYING 
vs. * WORKERS* COMPENSATION FUND 
JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
(SELF-INSURED) and/or * 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND * AND 
(FORMERLY STATE INSURANCE FUND) * 
and/or * GRANTING ^ORDON SCHOOL DISTRICT 
SECOND INJURY FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
MOTjION FOR REVIEW 
On ku&ust 20, 19&6, at\ Kdv\ix\istrative Law Jud&e. of \3\<& Covmissiow 
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order awarding the 
Applicant in the above captioned case temporary total compensation, permanent 
partial impairment benefits, and medicals related to three separate industrial 
accidents in which the Applicant was injured while employed with Jordan School 
District. The Applicant had been voluntarily paid by the defendants some 
temporary total compensation and medicals for t*fo of the three injuries 
involved. No permanent partial impairment benefits had been paid and no 
medical benefits or temporary total compensation for a surgery the Applicant 
had in March 1985, had been paid. Pursuant to the August 20, 1986 Order, the 
Applicant was awarded permanent partial impairment benefits and the 
Administrative. Law Judge apportioned the permanent partial impairment benefits 
between the Second Injury Fund, the Workers' Cdmpensation Fund, and the 
self-Insured employer due to the findings of the medical panel with respect to 
the underlying causes of the permanent partial impairment. Similarly, the 
Administrative Law Judge awarded medical expenses Related to the March 1985 
surgery and apportioned the expenses between the Second Injury Fund, the 
Workers' Compensation Fund and the Self-Insured employer per the medical panel 
findings regarding the causes of the 1985 surgery. Finally, the 
Administrative Law Judge ordered temporary total compensation benefits for the 
period of recovery from the 1985 surgery. However, the Administrative Law 
Judge found this temporary total compensation was the responsibility of the 
self-insured employer alone, and no contribution from the the Second Injury 
Fund or the Workers' Compensation Fund was ordered. 
On August 29, 1986, the Workers' Compensation Fund filed a Motion for 
Review with the Commission arguing that the Administrative Law Judge had no 
statutory authority to apportion compensation between the Workers' 
Compensation Fund and the self-insured employer. The Workers' Compensation 
Fund cites Mountain States Steel Company v. Industrial Commissiont 535 P.2d 
1249 (Utah 1975) and Duaine Brown Chevrolet Company v. Industrial 
Commission, 511 P.2d 743 (Utah 1973) as authority! for the proposition that 
apportionment of compensation between different catriers/employers cannot be 
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made in multiple accident cases. The Workers' Compensation Fund argues that 
these two cases stand for the proposition that it is the carrier/employer at 
the time of the last accident leading up to permanent impairment that is 
responsible for all impairment that results, regardless whether contribution 
from previous compensable industrial accidents can be established. The 
Workers1 Compensation Fund acknowledges the Industrial Commission's authority 
to apportion medical expenses as established by the case United States 
Fidelity and Guaranty vs. The Industrial Commission (Anderton), 657 P.2d 764 
(Utah 1983), but argues that apportionment of compensation between 
carriers/employers is still disallowed. The Workers' Compensation Fund 
asserts that the case David vs. Industrial Commission« 649 P.2d 82 (Utah 
1982) disallows apportionment of compensation except in cases where the 
impairments resulting from the multiple accidents are unrelated to each 
other. The Workers* Compensation Fund concludes that the self-insured 
employer in the instant case (the responsible defendant at the date of the 
most recent accident leading to impairment) should be held responsible for all 
the impairment with no contribution from the Workers* Compensation Fund as 
ordered by the Administrative Law Judge. 
On September 3, 1986, Jordan School District (the self-insured 
employer in the instant case) filed a Motion for Review contesting the 
Administrative Law Judge's finding that Jordan School District was responsible 
for all the temporary total compensation associated with the recovery period 
for the 1985 surgery. Jordan School District suggests that U.C.A. 35-1-69 
requires the Second Injury Fund or the Workers* Compensation Fund to pick up 
that portion of the temporary total compensation that was not the 
responsibility of the employer. Jordan School District contends that since it 
was determined that Jordan School District was responsible for only 16% of the 
medical expenses related to the 1985 surgery, that likewise Jordan School 
District should be responsible for only 16% of the temporary total 
compensation associated with the recovery period for the surgery. Jordan 
School District contends that the Second Injury Fund or the Workers* 
Compensation Fund is responsible for the remaining 84% of the temporary total 
compensation. On September 8, 1986, Jordan School District also filed a 
response to the Workers* Compensation Fund's August 29, 1986, Motion for 
Review. In that response, Jordan School District contends that the David case 
establishes Industrial Commission authority to apportion compensation between 
several carriers/employers in multiple accident cases, and thus, the 
Administrative Law Judge should be affirmed in his apportionment of the 
medical expenses and permanent partial impairment benefits. 
Addressing first the issue of apportionment between 
carriers/employers, the Commission finds that the Mountain States Steel case 
and the Duaine Brown Chevrolet case appear to disallow apportionment of 
compensation. However, the Commission finds that the more recent David case 
does allow apportionment of compensation where several different 
injuries/accidents are dealt with in one hearing and/or one order. That case 
does not specify the parameters delineating when apportionment will or will 
not be appropriate. Because the Court did not specify parameters in the David 
case, the Commission must decide whether apportionment of compensation between 
the Workers* Compensation Fund and Jordan School District is appropriate in 
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this case. Because this case involves three injuries/accidents which are 
being adjudicated for the first time, and which involve viable claims not 
barred by the Statute of Limitations, the Commission finds the Administrative 
Law Judge appropriately dealt with each injury separately and ordered benefits 
on each of the three injuries according to the medical panel's findings on 
causation. Therefore, the Commission must deny the Workers' Compensation 
Fund's Motion for Review with respect to the Administrative Law Judge's 
apportionment of compensation. 
finds it inconsistent to 
surgery and not apportion 
Regarding the non-apportionment of temporary total compensation, the 
Commission must reverse the Administrative Law Jud£e and grant Jordan School 
District's Motion for Review. The Commission 
apportion the medical expenses related to the 1985 
the temporary total compensation related to the recovery period for that 
surgery. The medical panel is clear that the need for surgery was the result 
of all three accidents and pre-existing conditions. If the need for surgery 
was the result of all three accidents and pre4existing conditions, then 
presumably the period of recovery for that surgery also resulted from all 
three accidents and pre-existing conditions. The Ctommission can find nothing 
in the medical panel report that contradicts this conclusion. Therefore, the 
Commission finds the temporary total compensation following the March 1985 
surgery, and the interest awarded thereon, should be apportioned in the same 
manner as was the medical expenses related to ttye surgery. The temporary 
total compensation and interest is a total of $15,335.71. Jordan School 
District is responsible for 16% or $2,453.71. The Workers' Compensation Fund 
is responsible for 34% or $5,214.14. The Second Injury Fund is responsible 
for 50% or $7,667.86 of which $2,441.18 should be paid to the Applicant and 
$5,226.68 to the Applicant's attorney. Referring to the Administrative Law 
Judge's August 20, 1986, Order, of the ten paragraphs in that Order, only 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 are amended by this Order]. Those three paragraphs 
should be replaced by the paragraph to follow; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Applicant is entitled 
to 45.286 weeks of temporary total compensation or a total 
of $14,038.66 as compensation for temporary total 
disability for the period of February 11, 1985, through 
December 14, 1985. The Applicant is also entitled to 
$1,297.05 in interest on these temporary total benefits. 
The temporary total compensation and interest are due in a 
lump sum and should be paid as follows^ Jordan School 
District shall pay the Applicant $2,453.71. The Workers' 
Compensation Fund shall pay the Applicant $5,214.14. The 
Second Injury Fund shall pay the Applicant $2,441.18 and 
shall pay the attorney for the Applicant, Michael J. 
Mazuran, $5,226.68 for services rendered in this matter. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all parts of the Administrative Law 
Judge*s August 20, 1986, Order in this matter not specifically amended herein, 
remain in effect and are final. 
Stephen M. Haciley s  
Chairman \ 
^ > C H ^ 
Walter T. Axelgard 
Commissioner 
Lenic^ Nielsen 
Commissioner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of UtahySalt Lake City, Utah, this 
< ^ ? < ^ a a y
 o f October, 1986 
ATTEST: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on October 25 » 1986 a copy of the attached Order 
Denying Workers* Compensation Fund's Motion for Review and Granting Jordan 
School District's Motion for Review was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
Workers' Compensation Fund 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury fund 
Robert A, Burton, Attorney, 600 Boston Bldg,f Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 
Gilbert R. Lamb, 8750 South 700 East, Sandy, Utah 84070 
Michael Mazuran, Attorney, 100 Boston Bldg,, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 
Smith Administrators, P*0. Box 6123, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Barbara 
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Eff. Date 
*** 
7/1/1972 
7/1/1973 
7/1/1974 
7/1/1975 
7/1/1976 
7/1/1977 
7/1/1978 
7/1/1979 
7/1/1980 
7/1/1981 
7/1/1982 
7/1/1983 
7/1/1984 
7/1/1985 . 
7/1/1986 
TEMPORARY TOTAL 
r 
Min. 
29 
35 
35 
45 
45 
. 45 
45 
45 , 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
* 
i 5 
! 5 
5 
5 
! 5 
! 5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5_ 
. Maximum 
54.00+ 
89.33 
95.33 
155.00 
1 169.00 
! 183.00 
! 197.00 
210.00 
230.00 
256.00 
284.00 
300.00 
310.00 
323.00 
329 ._0_0 . 
. PERMANENT PARTIAL 
Min. 
! 29 
35 
35 
! 45 
I 45 
! 45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 ! 
* 
| 5 
5 
1 5 
5 
1 5 
5 
1 5 
5 
1 5 
5 ! 
5.1 
5 
5 
5 1 
5 J 
j Maximum 
54.00+ 
89.33 
95.33 
[ 103.33 
\ 112.67 
• 122.00 
131.00 
140.00 
153.00 
171.00 
189.00 
. 200.00 
. 207.00 
.' 215.00 1 
• 219.00 1 
f PERMANENT TOTAL 
I Min. 
29 
35 
35 
1 45 
45 
45 
1 45 
45 
1 45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
. 45 
* 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
, Maximum 
54.00+ 
89.33 
95.33 
131.75 
I 143.65 
! 156.00 
167.00 
179.00 
196.00 
218.00 
241.00 
255.00 
264.00 
275.00 
280.00 
. DEATH 
i Death** 
I 54.00+ 
\ 89.33 
I 95.33 
i 131.75 
I 143.65 
I 156.00 
i 167.00 
179.00 
196.00 
218.00 
241.00 
255.00 
264.00 
275.00 
280.00 
. TOTAL 
6 Years 
24,648.00 
27.870.96 
29.742.96 
41.106.00 
44.818.00 
48.672.00 
52,104700 
55.848.00 
61,152.00 
68.016.00 
75.192.00 
79.560.00 
82.368.00 
85.800.00 
1 87.360.00 
* = Dependent's Allowance (In years with plus added to maximum- Now limited to spouse and k minor 
dependent children 
** = Only maximum shown. Figured as are other benefits. 
*** = As of this date, benefits not to exceed wage. 
Burial Benefit $1,800.00 
No Dependent Death Payment to Second Injury Fund or Default Indemnity Fund » $30,000. 
o 
